a journal of the international
council of philosophical inquiry with children
‘Child and Community
of Philosophical Inquiry’
Claire Cassidy
Abstract: Child and COPI.
It has
been asserted in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that children’s
voices should have a place in society and that their views and opinions should be
taken into account by policy makers and those others in authority. This paper suggests that children need to be
empowered and enabled to become active, participative, political agents within
society. Within certain countries – in
this instance, those constituting
Key words/phrases:
child,
citizenship, Community of Philosophical Inquiry.
This
paper will consider how the practice of Community of Philosophical Inquiry
(COPI) could be used as a tool for the empowerment of children within
society. It will be suggested that in
encouraging reasoning, citizenship is promoted and that this, in turn, is one
way to involve children as active, participative, political beings within
society. Indeed, as McCall (1991) holds
that,
Creating conditions which allow for the
emergence of both the disposition to inquire and the skills to reason empowers
people in a way that simple enfranchisement does not. Enfranchisement alone will not ensure
democracy. But the possession of inquiry
and reasoning skills empowers by enabling people – adults and children – to
seek for and deal with the truth – what is there. (p.38)
And it
is here that McCall raises a crucial issue – the empowerment of children. Clearly, if McCall discusses the empowerment
of children, then she considers them to be lacking in power or authority within
our society; she wishes to promote their ‘voices’ or give them some kind of
participatory role. It is true to say
that more and more adults are living their lives without children of their own,
but this means, as Qvortrup (1994, p.18) indicates, that a larger “… part of
the electorate which has nothing at stake as far as children are concerned is
growing” and are therefore making decisions on their behalf. Indeed, children’s lives are almost totally
directed and controlled by the adult population with little more than a nod in
the direction of the individuals such policy making concerns. Prout and James (1997) highlight this anomaly
when they say that children and their lives are determined and/or constrained
by adults in terms of the politics, educational, legal and administrative
processes that affect them. This is
exactly where children are discriminated against within our society, they are
not considered as equal to other groups within society, that is, adult groups,
and thus the notion of children as inferior members of society is constructed
and repeatedly reinforced. Qvortrup
(1994) talks of an ‘adultist’ imagery that isn’t conducive to seeing children
as anything other than subordinates. If
we are to give children a voice socially and politically we must be prepared
that we will be challenging the ways in which children are currently viewed by
society and we would thus be challenging, in some way, the accepted social
order. Children are not treated as equals
and as such different things are expected from them than from the adult members
of society. However, note that the
expectations are set by adults within
society.
Let us
consider what is expected of children with respect to their obligations in
society. In the polis of
Implicit
within this is the fact that one was a citizen at birth; similarly, it was the case that the child of a slave was
born a slave. Rousseau (1948), too, believes we have an
obligation within society too induct children into being active members of
society, he would suggest that social structures with their values and
obligations are taught and learned from infancy, since he held that as
individuals our value is dependent upon the society or community to which we
belong. Jenks (1996) further asserts
that children are seen and treated as subordinates until they pass through a
period of being socialised into being an adult competent being.
This
notion of the child becoming into acceptable adulthood, ‘competent’ adulthood,
begins early in life in order that we recognise our role – our future adult
role, our future adult role as citizen.
This is not a new notion, Lyman Jr. (1995) traces this lack of moral
ability, this lack of knowing how one should behave back to the early medieval
period when it was expected that children had to learn how to be moral. Being moral is an attribute preserved for
adulthood, and a citizen is certainly someone of moral worth, but it is
important that children are inculcated into the ways of morality, that they
learn what will be expected of them as members of society, and this initiation
takes place during one’s childhood.
Shamgar-Handelman (1994) suggests that childhood is the time that
society sets aside for such training for an acceptable adulthood. Children thus learn the acceptable patterns
of behaviour and how to regulate these patterns through the adults they
encounter who will model what is acceptable, appropriate and adult and will
highlight and eradicate behaviours which fail to fit into these categories of
acceptableness, appropriateness or adultness.
Rousseau
(1955) believes that what we ought to learn as children is what we will need to
practise as adults. It appears that the
only obligation or duty a child must perform in society is that one must learn
– by whatever means – how to conduct oneself in society. Values and cultural norms should be absorbed
in order that the prevalent moral code be maintained, it would seem, without
question or contradiction. Jenks (1996)
echoes this notion when he discusses making sense of the child in terms of its
potential. He goes on to suggest we
educate the child into compliance. There
is currently a large move within the British education sectors – prompted by
governmental policy – that citizenship be taught as part of the school
curriculum. Again, this suggests that
education or schooling is a preparation for adulthood and the moral codes
deemed ‘valuable’ by the acting adult moral majority – children must learn how
to behave in the adult world. It appears
that citizenship education is masking what may be called moral education, and
in moral education, it is to be understood that one is here talking about
determining behaviour and dictating what is reasonable and acceptable
behaviour. Downie (1971, p.65) maintains
that it is important that children are taught – or even trained – that their
desires should be “… directed towards socially permissible or desirable ends”. Downie’s view amounts, in negative terms, to
the fact that society wishes to control its future citizens and it does so
through education. Lawson (2001) too
sees the negative, and somewhat worrying, aspect of training young people in
schools – one of the institutions established by the State –
Rather than relying on the slow process of
attitudinal change, or tackling the root causes of social issues such as racism
or youth disaffection, the government is imposing their set of values on
individuals with the caution that, if those individuals do not accept them,
they will not be able to claim their rights of citizenship. Implicit within this is the idea that we
should not be concerned about reasons for participation and motivations for
actions. Rather than attempting a
wholesale shift in attitude, it is appearances that matter. (p.168)
Before
even formal schooling plays its part in the formation of the child as future
participant in society, the family has a key role. It is within the family that we first learn
how the social system works. The child
is part of the system, yet he/she
must learn his/her place and what is expected of him/her as a child and, in the
future, as an adult. This is more like
the training one gives a pet dog – with rewards and punishments we train it to
sit, stay, roll over, give a paw or not sit on the furniture – it soon learns
its place within the social hierarchy of the household; similarly, so does the
child – and in much the same way. James,
Jenks and Prout (1998) similarly raise this issue when they discuss the control
exerted upon all aspects of children’s lives to the point where adults
timetable eating, sleeping, washing and even excreting for their children.
The
amount of control children have over their own lives is extremely limited in a
range of spheres within their social lives.
Limitations are frequently placed on children and they must learn these
limitations in order that they know their place in the hierarchy that is our
society. In Britain there is a nine
o’clock ‘watershed’ where programmes with a particular content – a content
deemed too ‘adult’, perhaps because of sex, violence or the use of ‘strong’
language – are postponed until after the watershed when it is assumed children
will be either in bed or parents will not have such programmes on the
television because they are aware of the potential content at this time of
night. Similarly, cinemas rate films
with a particular certificate which is allocated according to age, for example
there are films where one must be over twelve, fifteen or eighteen in order to
gain admission to the cinema to watch the film.
Other such limitations on children are often limits on their physical
freedom, for instance, curfews imposed by parents or the police or the
opportunity for females under sixteen to take the contraceptive pill.
Adults
possess an inordinate amount of power and control over children and their
desire to be ‘grown-up’, to be adult.
Adults determine not only what is acceptable behaviour for an
individual, but this is further extended by determining how children will – in
future – participate in society, they are shaping future citizens. Citizenhood
is perceived to be a valuable and desirable thing to possess, yet it is
becoming ever more evident that for children, while they are being trained in
the ways of being citizens, they are not – as children – permitted to practise
their citizening skills. James, Jenks
and Prout (1998) recognise the dangers that are inherent in handing over power
and decision-making to a ‘caretaker’ (as Archard (1993) calls these controlling
adults), although one should bear in mind that children have not handed over
power or authority to adult caretakers, they never had the power to hand over
in the first place and these adults act on what they remember as their
experience of having been a child.
Rousseau
(1955) firmly holds that children should be taught in a manner that will
encourage them, in the future, to see the State, society, in a familial way;
they should learn that they have a responsibility or duty to the State and the
will of the majority – he is keen to stress the obedience that one should
demonstrate. The family is perhaps the
first model we encounter of a political society and then we move on to
school. There are power and authority
structures in place in both of these institutions and the child quickly learns
how to work within and around them since the child is never one to be in the
seat of power or authority in either of these contexts. McGowan Tress (1998) tells us that ancient
Building
upon the point that children should be trained for the role they will later
undertake one can see that this role playing begins early on in one’s life, in
the family, school and other social groups.
Emmet (1966) gives us the power to ascribe ourselves roles, or at least
describe how we are to perform that role.
The point about the role of child is
that it is given, as is the expected
behaviour and values that go along with it.
Very quickly the child learns his or her role through the ways in which
people react and respond to him or her, which in turn begins to develop the
idea of where one ‘fits in’ and so begins to shape the self of the child, but
the self can only be shaped in relation to one’s interactions with others. Even if one does not interact with others,
this non-interaction is still a shaping device and will ultimately bear on how
one places oneself in the social hierarchy and thus on one’s role.
Once
the child has begun to assimilate this sense of self as he/she more and more
adopts the ‘appropriate’ role, he/she will then begin to understand what is
expected in terms of performance and behaviour and what is not acceptable
within the society into which it has been born.
So perhaps, then, there are only two duties or obligations that a child
is expected to undertake. Firstly, he/she must be ‘available’, make an effort
and be receptive to the training which prepares one for adulthood and
citizenship within society, and secondly, that one adopts the role ‘child’ and
conducts oneself in the expected and appropriate manner, especially in relation
to others. A relevant example may be
when a child is upset with another child and hits out, a nearby adult might
suggest that he/she doesn’t know any better, he/she ‘is only a child’; this
behaviour, while expected as part of being a child, is excused for the same
reason. However, under the child’s
obligation to learn how one behaves in one’s adult role in society, one will
come to learn that hitting out is not acceptable behaviour and therefore not
within the role of adult. It may be
suggested that in return for fulfilling one’s obligations or duties one
receives certain privileges in the form of rights.
Privileges in some sense are perhaps contrary to
the notion of rights. It may be posited
that rights are things we are entitled to by virtue of our existence, yet if we
are given citizenhood at birth, we automatically inherit the duties discussed
previously. However, merely because one
has been born into a society where certain things are expected, an entitlement
to rights does not automatically follow.
It is therefore, preferable to talk of rights in terms of privileges –
made and attributed by humans, much like citizenhood rather than being natural
in origin – they would not, and could not, exist without people. Bellamy (1996), the Executive Director of
Unicef, advocates a world of rights for children which allows that they have
more of a participatory role within society.
Throughout
the twentieth century and into this new century, the movement towards increased
rights for children has gathered impetus.
It is perhaps worth noting that the rights afforded children are
certainly being legitimised by the State in its legislation, however, the
interesting issue is that it is the adult population that is determining what
rights should be in place. In fact, this
very issue is discussed by Boyden (1997) when she considers how little a role –
none in fact – children had in forming the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and equally they have had no input on how best to implement the
decisions taken for them and about them since the Convention’s inception. So while advocating children’s rights the Convention
manages to fall foul of its own intentions.
However, at least in considering the issue one may argue that a new
perspective is being put on the notion of childhood and it is this
reconstruction that is of value.
While
the point of citizenship is to work for the betterment of society as a whole
rather than concentrating one’s efforts on specific individuals or groups
within society, there is the danger that minority groups – and children fall
into this category – may have their behaviour and living conditions dictated by
a more powerful group such as adult society, which in turn would lead to a
suppression of rights for the minority group.
It is wise to be careful in considering the ways and practices that are
used to afford children protection. Qvortrup (1997) highlights that some forms of
protection may be negative for children as they protect adults and their social
order from the presence of children.
The
notion of citizenship and how active one is, or is allowed to be, is an issue
of power and, in the context of children and adults, children certainly have
the less powerful stance and are thus limited in the contributions they can
make because of this powerful ‘dominance’ adults have over them. So, while adult society is issuing decrees
about children’s rights and entitlements, adults are still very much in
control, driving the issues and agendas of what children’s entitlements should
be and in what ways they can participate.
Children are given rights, but there seems little purpose in providing
rights if children cannot avail themselves of the rights involved, or, in point
of fact, if they want these rights in
the first place since they have been instituted by the adult majority group.
We
have, however, formulated some rights which this ambiguous group are able to
access but what is particularly
interesting about the Convention’s articles, is that there are no rights there
listed that are not also afforded to adults.
This is possibly where the confusion lies with this relatively new
concept of child, that we are coming
full circle to a time when there was no notion of child and are giving children the opportunity to be adults, or to
perform the adult role. Thus, in the vast majority of respects we still want
these individuals to be children and the method we have for preserving this
state is power. And it is this ‘adult’
power that acts most effectively by not promoting the younger members of our
society within the decision making process, they are given a voice when adults
see fit. Interestingly, this appears to
be the main thrust of the Convention that has been taken up most strongly
within our society and more specifically in the present British Government’s
push for Citizenship Education. Aristotle
(1955) would hold that there is no place for politics in the life of children
and no place for children in the life of politics as they don’t have enough
life experience. Aristotle can relax,
for while citizenship education is becoming ever more present in schools,
little of its content has to do with the politics of the wider society and even
where it does stray into this realm, children are firmly kept in their place
until old enough to participate on the political stage. Newell (1991) would support the claim that
children are kept at a distance to the political world that acts on their
behalf and suggests that because of their age and status children are
discriminated against.
There
is much to contend with here, yet, in allowing a space or opportunity for views
to be taken account of, the status of children may be improved upon. In being receptive to the views of this group
– not even a minority group in the sense of the numbers belonging to it – true
representation can be provided. The
sticking point is not so much that children be enabled to express their views,
it is more that those with power are determining whether or not the views are
considered and ‘reasonable’. Newell (1991, p.44) suggests that Article 12
“… is the cornerstone of the Convention’s insistence that children must not be
treated as silent objects of concern, but as people with their own views and
feelings which must be taken seriously”.
Article 10 states that children have the right to develop their own
views, ideas and opinions freely without external interference of this freedom
– yet, there are still restrictions in the sense that maturity of reasoning,
age, ability to articulate are all heavily cited, yet these are not factors
(other than age) that are confined to children.
Children’s powers of reasoning, argumentation and their ability to
listen and take on board alternative ideas are given little emphasis which is
perhaps why the adult/child divide persists; it suits the adult power holders
that children’s views can be expressed, and possibly be taken account of, but
that they are much less able to reason than the adults – this is patently not
true. Archard (1993) highlights exactly
why children are excluded from the adult world of reason and understanding, he
says that children lack adult dispositions such as being rational, or
autonomous or that they are not conscious of their beliefs and desires and so
may not participate in the adult world.
In many
ways children are what women once were – and to a certain extent still are –
within the power structures of society.
Faulks (2000) suggests that women often have to decide whether or not to
forego their differences from men and work towards a politics of difference
with special rights and responsibilities.
The difference between this picture of women and the situation in which
children find themselves – and it is quite a major point – is that women, by
virtue of being seen to be adults, have still more power than children to
create a role or agenda for themselves.
Certainly
it is adult human beings that set the agenda or contract, yet children are obliged
to abide by the contract although they are still not citizens in the sense that
at present the voice of children is somewhat tokenistic with inroads only being
made in May 2002 with the United Nations Special Session on Children, a
consultation with children representatives from around the world. It remains to be seen what influence the
children’s views have had on the policy makers from the adult community also
attending the summit. Further, while not
formally accepting a covenant or contract – since their voices and actions are
somewhat determined by external forces – children do comply with this covenant
or contract as part of their obligations in order that they gain membership to
society, strive towards citizenhood and ‘grow’ into adulthood. Archard (1998) indicates Locke’s agreement
with this perception of children as growing into adulthood as ‘imperfect
reasoners’. Again it seems since
children are not perceived to be suitably adept reasoners, they cannot be
citizens in their own right. Faulks
(2000) is clear when he posits that an ethic of participation and active
citizenship must be encouraged by considering how one may exercise one’s rights
and responsibilities. This is as true
for our younger members of society as for our more established ones – we must
promote an ethos whereby individuals see and understand the need for
co-operation and interdependence for the creation of a community. Perhaps there is some realisation – in this
new interest in education for citizenship - that everyone acting as an
individual to further his/her own gains works against the advancement of
society as a whole.
There
are, though, some aspects of this movement which may cause concern. Lawson (2001) suggests that it appears that
classes in citizenship do not promote opportunities to discuss issues or to
challenge the status quo. Lessons on
drugs and sex are incorporated within citizenship classes which appear to be
lessons on morality more than, as Lawson posits, places where pupils can raise
issues of concern in order to debate and discuss them. Somehow the citizenship classes imply some
kind of control, where the accepted moral code is held to be the way forward
and the route into adult life and full citizenship. One wonders
if it is possible to fail these classes in citizenship and what one would have
to do in order to fail.
Indeed,
we cannot consider moral issues by simply doing as we are told by the power or
authority in charge – this is the case both in schools and the wider world,
both for school pupils and those outwith formal education. Lawson (2001) suggests that by encouraging
participation in community activities while at school, children will be
inclined to be participative within their communities in later life. After all, it is this promotion of community
spirit which will, it is hoped, work within a society in order to create and
maintain an active community with an effective – and active – citizenry,
fulfilling obligations and maintaining the provision for the rights received
under the reciprocal relationship formally established by society – or rather,
the individuals working together that constitute that society. We should take care not to confuse the idea
of ‘community spirit’ with the controlling of behaviour and moral codes. The notion of community should be concerned
with the sharing of ideas and opinions in order to better society as a whole. ‘Better’ needing to be defined through
dialogue, discussion and debate as the
members of a society may not – indeed, probably will not – all agree on how
they may define the ‘betterment’ of society.
For
Plato (1987) it was important that order and respect for order be learned at an
early age; even the games of children should teach these orderly habits and
built into these games would be the opportunity for correcting or altering
‘flaws’ that may exist in a society, so that they may be eradicated over time
as the youngsters progress to being fully active citizens. Plato is even more prescriptive regarding the
organisation of the young and how they should learn for the betterment of
society. Children over the age of ten
should be sent away from their parents’ influence in order to establish a firm
notion of society and all that this should entail for the good of its citizens. The intention is that the children would not
have free rein until they had learned the societal structures and until they
had been educated for their future role in life. This, it could be argued, is how Citizenship
Education is manifesting itself today in some ways – certainly within
Lipman
(1988, p.3) talks of Callicles in the ‘Gorgias’ insinuating that “… philosophy
is for children only: grown-ups had better get on with the serious business of
life”. This is a move away from the idea
that children are non or pre-rational beings, Callicles is certainly affording
children some commendation that is often not readily attributed to them, however,
he does abstract the child from the ‘serious business of life’. All members of society participate to a
greater or lesser degree in society and life in general, and younger members of
society have much to contribute as they form a large proportion of the physical
world of life. Children, it is argued,
are as capable and competent of commenting and reflecting upon the ‘serious
business of life’ which ultimately affects their existence and
functioning. Philosophising in Community
of Philosophical Inquiry (COPI) is perhaps the best method we have for children
to participate as citizens within society, even by forming citizens’ juries
perhaps entirely made up of children and following the COPI model.
McCall
(1991) asserts that in order to engage in philosophical
inquiry one need not have a vast range of empirical knowledge. Notions such as beauty, truth, justice or
reality can be reasoned about while having little experience of the world. Very often Communities of Philosophical
Inquiry involving eight or nine year old participants will raise the same
questions, issues and arguments as a community of participants in their
forties, fifties or sixties. The vocabulary, or the availability of extensive
examples upon which to draw, are the only differences between these age groups,
although, when asked for an example, younger community members are able to
provide a very adequate one from their realm of experiences. Further, having a broad ranging vocabulary
does not preclude one from finding it difficult to say what one wants to say or
say what one means. As McCall (1991)
correctly highlights, there is a traditional image of the child as non-rational
or pre-rational and that they are able to think neither logically nor
abstractly. She adds that this view, perpetuated
by developmental psychology, relies on criteria drawn from formal logic for its
definition of rationality. It should be
noted that many adults would not be considered rationally or logically capable
under such terms. Indeed, many children
discuss topics in philosophical terms that raise issues considered by
recognised philosophers. The whole
notion of stage maturation theory has disallowed pre-adolescents from being
acknowledged as having reasoning powers.
On the contrary, from an early age humans are able and competent
reasoners and it is through one’s usage of these skills that one becomes more
able to reason, reflect and analyse.
Mill (1985, p.122) acknowledges that “The mental and the moral, like the
muscular, powers are improved only by being used”. And this is vital in considering how children
are perceived and in what ways they are permitted to be part of society.
Anyone,
of whatever age, will develop their reasoning skills with practise – arguments
and reasoning will become more complex and ‘mature’ with practise, not
necessarily as a result of the reasoner being older. Certainly the majority of younger individuals
have less experience of living in the world than the majority of older
individuals, however, it is not necessarily the case that more practical
worldly experience will make one a clear and more effective reasoner; in fact,
one’s thinking may be obscured because one is entrenched and comfortable in the
assumptions upon which one’s life has become founded. These young people are open to possibilities
and should be encouraged to challenge and question the world around them if
they are to be effective citizens working to promote community. The practice of COPI facilitates this type of
reasoning in the participants – whatever their age. Indeed, McCall (1991) points out that the
structure of agreement and disagreement with supporting argument, explaining to
others and the adding to the ideas of others act as counter-evidence that
children are egocentric.
Children
are, like their older counterparts, empowered by participating in a COPI. While they may not, at present, be in the
position to directly influence policy making, they will – through COPI –
develop the necessary skills to inquire, think, reason and participate
effectively as citizens in the wider community.
Individually children can learn how to listen to alternative viewpoints,
how to posit alternative viewpoints – even alternatives to what they currently
hold – how to build upon previous arguments and develop them whereby they can
demonstrate their application in the wider world. Not only will these areas be developed,
participants will grow in their social interactions; they will become more
aware of how different individuals can be, but at the same time, learn how to
work with these different individuals for a common cause. Warnock (1992) advocates philosophy, or a
philosophical approach, being included within the school curriculum, or rather
more as a way of life within the school in an endeavour to prepare children to
face the challenges they will encounter throughout their lives. Warnock, however, fails to see that the
skills acquired during such times as when children are encouraged and aided in
their reasoning will be of benefit to them in the here and now and not simply
when they become adults.
Personalities
often diminish within a COPI and a loyalty to the dialogue emerges – it is the
discussion that becomes important, but how it could affect people at a group or
individual level is often countenanced.
Further, within the inquiry, topics arise for consideration that may be felt
not to be suitable or accessible for children; in COPI children are free to
discuss subjects usually held onto by the ‘adult world’ so that they, children,
are not ‘distressed’ by the ideas emerging.
There is evidence of Philosophical Inquiry with primary and early
secondary school-aged participants discussing topics such as death, love,
marriage, the existence (or not) of God, terrorism, bigotry, prejudice, truth
and justice. Similarly, in adult groups,
these subjects have also emerged and often the self same issues emerge in the
inquiries, but the children are less inclined to try to stick to a line of
reasoning in order to persuade than some adults. They (the children) seem to be more willing
to engage fully without the distraction of what they ‘know’ about how the world
external to the COPI functions.[1]
There
is, though, an inherent equality within a COPI; value of participation is not
determined by the number of times an individual contributes to the
dialogue. One may be silent throughout
the majority of an inquiry or, indeed, throughout a series of inquiries, but
that participant is thinking and following the argument and will ultimately take
away what was said to his/her life outside the community and he/she has the
potential to change in some way as a result of the inquiry or reflection upon
it after the session has ended. Not only
has the individual the potential to change as a result of the inquiry, he/she
has the potential to change the environment, institutions and other individuals
around him/her – all this regardless of age.
Morrison and McCulloch (2000) suggest that politicians should look to
new ways of engaging with young people to facilitate debate, participation and decision
making within society and COPI may just be the way to provide for this. It should be said, though, that this cannot
be tokenistic, action must be taken based upon the young people’s input. It is important that young people are not
only encouraged to inquire and inquire in depth, but that this be facilitated
for them in order that they can challenge received wisdom and develop their own
beliefs and thinking. This is precisely
why a practice such as COPI is useful for all members of our society, individuals
should be aware that everything is open to question.
While
it is vital that society members question and inquire through the sharing of
ideas and opinions in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry, the only issue here
may be, if one wishes to use the dialogue as a means for change in the society
and the community, that it is difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain
exactly how the individual feels, or what he/she personally holds as it is the
case within COPI that he/she is able to offer ideas not as personally held
beliefs which will be contributions to the dialogue and also bearing in mind
that the inquiry does not seek a consensus or conclusion. However, the COPI could be the place where
citizens – of whatever age – are trained and practised in their reasoning
skills to allow that they may participate in society, whereby decisions or
individual conclusions may be reached in order that action may be taken –
having been informed through the argumentation skills inherited from the COPI.
Additionally, the COPI is a useful place to air as many views as possible in
order that individuals have perspectives to consider in formulating their
personal standpoints in order to generate action. It is therefore not simply the promotion of a
young individual’s right to have his/her opinions or views heard – which is
indeed a shift in the running of society – but all members of that society
should be treated as citizens and should have an equal voice. The equality that exists in the COPI is one from
which society could borrow; where all participants,
of whatever age, are encouraged to reason, reflect and inquire. Siegel (1988) reinforces the idea that we
desire for our community critical thinkers, individuals who are adept reasoners
and who are receptive to the reasoning of others – this is what will shift
society towards community, and this is what Community of Philosophical Inquiry
aims to promote. Siegel sees critical
thinking as an ability to reason and use such reasoning skills to justify one’s
beliefs, claims and actions. It is this
reasoning that makes one a critical thinker.
Siegel’s definition of a critical thinker does not preclude children.
This
takes us back to the medieval period when children were not set apart from
adults and were privy to all conversations and activities – with the notable
exception of decision making, however, the ordinary ‘man/woman on the street’
was not at that time involved in the decision making process either. Being a child is, it seems, that time when
decisions are taken for us because it is believed that we cannot contribute as
citizens. Yet, there are older society
members for whom this is also the case, for instance, those suffering from a
mental illness, or even prisoners in criminal institutions are not permitted to
play a part in the decision making process, and although they are not called
children, it is often acknowledged that they are treated like children. What is the
implication, then, for children or younger members of our society?
Perhaps
the question of citizenhood is an issue here, for that is what allows one to
participate in society, and as yet children are not perceived of or treated as
citizens. A voice is now being given to
them, but not in any formal manner on a regular basis and this opportunity to
raise ideas or opinions appears still to be seen as a preparation for citizenhood when one is an adult. It should also be noted that we talk of
‘giving’ children a voice. It is
important that we are wary of giving
children a voice; they should be able to speak out for themselves, a forum and
means should be created for such a thing to happen to avoid an adult mouthpiece
stating children’s opinions under his/her own interpretation. A much more inclusive society – a community
perhaps – is needed where all individuals have a platform to speak from and be
heard in order that their views may influence policy and practice. deWinter (1997) advocates encouraging
children in participation in community development as this allows them to help
shape their living environment and will, in turn, strengthen their commitment
to society.
Children,
then, appear to be constrained by their social status. This highlights the need to redefine the
boundaries of childhood. Yes, children
should be afforded protection from harm by the State, but then, so should all
individuals. Yes, children’s voices
should be taken account of in decision and policy making, but then, so should
the voices of all individuals who are citizens.
Yes, children should have rights, but they too are bound by obligations
like the older members of our society; and not all adult obligations are the
same or equal, since not everyone lives in the same environment or under the
same set of circumstances. Likewise, the
obligations that younger individuals take on need not be the same as each other
or those belonging to the older members of society.
Children
can and do judge their actions and the actions of others and Darling (2000,
p.1) recognises that it is expected
behaviours that are talked about when considering children’s role or status in
society and asks an important question, one that does not take account of
children having a moral code of their own which society has yet to shape to
coincide with the accepted and ruling moral code; he asks “… why murder
perpetrated by a child should require an enquiry of a kind seldom triggered by
murder by an adult”. In answer to his
question, he suggests that it is because children are perceived of as innocent
– this is their natural condition - and that badness comes through exposure to
an imperfect society. There are several
points at issue here. In answer to
Darling’s initial question, an enquiry is possibly held because our current
society does not perceive children as being capable of reasoning about an action
such as murder, that they may not see it as wrong because their moral code, in
such an instance, has not been bent into the accepted shape of the
majority. The child murderer may not be
fully aware of the consequences incurred in society by perpetrating a murder,
unlike his/her adult counterpart who has been fully inducted into the
‘acceptable’ modes of being in a society which may mean that the young murderer
lacks the experience which informs one of the results of such an act that may,
in fact, be the deterrent the older potential murderer has. Secondly, childhood is perhaps not so much
the period of innocence that Darling suggests, but rather a time when one is
coming to terms with one’s obligations and is learning the accepted behaviour
pattern and experience has not yet demonstrated to the child all that is on
offer, thus preserving ‘innocence’ by not making available vices or
opportunities which will later become much more evident. One may add to this that ‘badness’ is not so
much acquired later as attributed
later – the new member of society must learn what society perceives as being
bad or wrong, which may (or may not) conflict with his/her own moral code. Mayo (1986, p.8) asserts that morality is not
merely a way of behaving but is, in actual fact, a way of thinking about behaving. He
says that “Morality necessarily involves moral thinking as well as moral
action” (p.8) and this is yet another feature or attribute children are
considered not to possess. However, Community of Philosophical Inquiry
disproves this as time and time again children within a COPI will discuss – at
very deep philosophical levels – moral issues and dilemmas. Finally, as to Darling’s suggestion that it
is the ‘imperfect society’ which alters the innocence of the young; certainly
experience of society perhaps alters the child and his/her ‘innocence’, but the
notion of an ‘imperfect’ society
remains to be defined. Society can only
be what its members make it and for it to be perfect implies that everyone is
the same, will be the same and will share the same ideas, that it is static –
this cannot be the case. Mill (1985)
links childhood and old age together in the way that society treats individuals
and the way they view them in terms of their rational conduct.
Morgan (1994,
p.137) states that “Once the child has learned the meaning of ‘why’ and
‘because’, he has become a fully paid up member of the human race”. Perhaps adults do not want children to
question and reason because in taking account of their views, ideas and
opinions they may have to alter their own.
Childhood could be seen as a period of indoctrination, the time when
young humans become less animal or instinctual and learn how one is expected to
be in society. Yet now that Britain’s government
and society’s educators are talking in terms of Citizenship Education and
Education for Citizenship, a more participative model of society is required –
we are breeding citizens, but this begins when young; individuals have their
reasoning skills facilitated and honed in order that they may contribute to the
emergent community – once more, as in the Middle Ages, the boundaries of
child/adult are becoming blurred. Like
the COPI, individuals are important, but individuals as individuals, not because they possess a certain age or
status. Community of Philosophical
Inquiry is a positive model for our society and how the younger members of that
society are treated. It is this issue
of how we involve children – or individuals who fall into this category – in
our society in a participative manner which is of importance.
It has
been suggested that through Community of Philosophical Inquiry children would
be promoted in the social sphere and would become more equal members of society
and the community created by the sense of common purpose engendered by such a
practice. At present children are given
a voice within society only in terms of what adults want to relate and even
then it is through the mouths of adults that we come to hear what adults think
or interpret the children as saying. The
world of the child is one which is closely controlled and monitored, their
lives are timetabled and barriers are put in the way of their enjoying the
opportunities or experiences afforded to adult members of society. Children are expected to be innocent and
receptive individuals – this is the role they are expected to play and while in
this role they are trained into the model of the ‘acceptable’ adult. What is needed, it has been claimed here, is
that children are in need of empowerment.
Ironically, the empowerment can only be given by adults; children should
be encouraged to be citizens, they should be given opportunities to explore the
issues that impact upon their lives and the lives of the wider society, they
should have their own voices and have a place in society where these voices may
be heard and have notice taken of them.
The voices of children, and equally those of adults, should not exist in
isolation where everyone is free to expound their thoughts and theories, what
is important is that a sense of community is created and that what people –
adults and children – see as important is that there is dialogue and it is this
dialogue that can and will effect change.
One way in which change could be facilitated is through providing the
tools for effective dialogue where critical reasoning is encouraged and the
tools for such reason and reflection are practised - through Community of
Philosophical Inquiry.
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